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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintif!-Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

PATRICK DELANER .JOHNSON,

12147

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal follows the appellant's conviction of Assault with a Deadly Weapon, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-7-6 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Patrick Delaner Johnson, was found
guilty by a jury of the crime of Assault with a Deadly
Weapon in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Merrill C.
Faux, Judge, Presiding, and was sentenced accordingly.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent asks this court to affirm the judgment
of the lower court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts
as outlined by the appellant. lt should be emphasized, however, that there were several people who saw the appellant
stab Mr. Calder and this fact was never denied by the appellant. The appellant relied upon the doctrice of self defense.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IT \VAS NOT ERROR TO ADMIT THE STATEMENT OF THE APPELLANT WHICH WAS
MADE TO OFFICER RALPH WHITAKER.
THE STATEMENT WAS COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY AND DID NOT INFRINGE UPON
THE APPELLANT'S RIGHT AGAINST 8ELFINCRIMINATION.
It is the respondent's position that the statement made

by the appellant to Officer Ralph Whitaker on September
3, 1969, was a voluntary statement and hence a waiver of
his right against self-incrimination.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966) applies only
to custodial interrogations. Miranda does not apply to
statements which are made voluntarily. In writing the
opinion for the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Warren emphasized:
"Volunteered statements of any kind are not
barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissi-

bility is not affected by our holding today." Id. at
478.
It must be emphasized that the statement concerning another charge was made by the appellant himself (T. 116).
He cannot now claim that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated when he clearly waived that right by
making volunteered statements to Officer Whitaker. In
State v. Jiminez, 22 Utah 2d 233, 451 P. 2d 583 (1969), the
Utah Court held that unsolicited statements made by a
defendant to a police officer are admissible. In Jiminez as
in this case the defendant was given the Miranda warnings
prior to making any statements (T. 116). "Any statement
given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U. S. at 478. It does not matter that the statement made by the appellant indicated that he had been involved in another crime for which he was being questioned
at the time. The prosecutor introduced this statement only
to show that the appellant was at the Jocor Lounge on the
night of the stabbing, and that he did stab someone. There
was no plan, as the appellant claims, to show that the appellant had been involved in several crimes. The evidence
was not introduced for the purpose of showing propensity
to commit crime, nor for the purpose of disgracing the
appellant. The evidence was introduced to negate appellant's claim of self-defense. The statement made to Officer
Whitaker was devoid of any question regarding self-defense. He stated that he could understand being picked up
for stabbing a man at the Jocor Lounge (T. 116). His
statement is clearly probative on the issue of what he
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thought at the time of the stabbing, i.e., he thought he had
committed a crime and was not surprised at being picked
up.
The respondent submits that the trial court did not
commit error in allowing this statement into evidence. The
statement was made voluntarily and constituted a waiver
of the appellant's right against self-incrimination.
POINT II.

THE TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY OFFICER
WHITAKER WAS HARMLESS AND DID NOT
AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF
THE APPELLANT.
In State v. Scandrett, 468 P. 2d 639 (Utah 1970), the
following statement is found:
"If it appears that an accused has been abused
or imposed upon by the denial of a constitutional
right or otherwise, so there is any likelihood that he
was unjustly convicted; the conviction should not be
permitted to stand. On the other hand, unless there
is some possibility, a rule should not be regarded as
an abstraction apart from its reason for existence,
and a mere technical violation or deviation be permitted to set free one who was no way abused or
imposed upon, and who is obviously guilty of a
crime. To do so comports with neither sense nor
justice, and defeats the real purpose such rules were
intended to serve." Id. at 642.

The respondent does not dispute the rule that evidence
of prior convictions or arrests are inadmissible unless the
defendant opens the door for such testimony. It has been
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held, however, that where the evidence is not prejudicial
there is no ground for reversible error. State v. Barone, 92
Utah 571, 70 P. 2d 73fi (1937). ''After hearing on appeal
the court must give judgment without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 ( 1953). In Barone,
where the prosecuting attorney brought out evidence of
prior convictions, the court cited this statute and said:
"We have examined the record in this case and
are convinced that the guilt of the defendant . . .
was so conclusively established by proper evidence
that the presumption of prejudice arising from the
attempt to prove a prior conviction and the statement of the district attorney in relation thereto
was overcome." Id. at 576, 70 P. 2d at 737.
The evidence in this case is equally convincing. There
were several eye witnesses including the victim himself who
testified that the appellant stabbed Mr. Calder (T. 17, 33).
The appellant himself admitted the stabbing ('T. 62). Obviously the jury did not accept the plea of self defense even
though they were properly instructed on all the aspects of
self defense ( R. 44-49) . In view of the competent evidence
which conclusively proved the appellant's guilt the statement made by Officer Whitaker did not prejudice the appellant. In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P. 2d 297
(1969), the Utah Court said after citing Section 77-42-1:
". . . the error must be such that it is reasonably probable that there would have been a result
more favorable to the appellant in the absence of
error. We cannot reasonably conclude that the inadvertent remark by the police officer, during cross-
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examination, deprived defendants of a fair trial,
since a review of the record substantiates that defendants' guilt was conclusively proven by competent evidence." Id. at 238, 461 P. 2d at 302.
The inadvertent remark was that the officer used a "prison
release picture" for identification purposes. The testimony
in this case did not so clearly indicate that appellant was
being interrogated on another charge.
The appellant has failed to show any substantial prejudice and therefore the presumption of validity must stand.
The appellant was given a fair trial and the jury rendered
a guilty verdict supported by clear and convincing evidence,
notwithstanding the statement by Officer Whitaker.
The Court stated further in Scandrett:
"There are certainly conceivable circumstances
where the violation of a constit11tional right could
have no possible bearing on any unfairness or imposition upon the defendant, or upon a correct determination of his guilt or innocence." Id. at 643.
This ruling is in accord with the rationale of the United
States Supreme Court in California v. Chapman, 386 U. S.
18 (1967) and Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250
(1969).
There is nothing to justify the reversal of appellant's
conviction. The evidence was overwhelming and there was
no likelihood whatsoever of a different result in the absence
of such alleged error or irregularity.

7

CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that appellant's conviction
should be affirmed in that the statement made by appellant
to Officer Whitaker was voluntary and constituted a waiver
of his right against self-incrimination or in the alternative,
that the statement made by Officer Whitaker was harmless
and did not affect the substantial rights of Mr. Johnson.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

